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Abstract 
 
American fiscal policy has been procyclical:    Washington wasted the 
expansion period 2001-2007 by running budget deficits, but by 2011 had 
come to feel constrained by inherited debt to withdraw fiscal stimulus.  Chile 
has achieved countercyclical fiscal policy – saving in booms and easing in 
recession – during the same decade that rich countries forgot how to do so.      
Chile has a rule that targets a structural budget balance.  But rules are not 
credible by themselves.  In Europe and the U.S., official forecasts are overly 
optimistic in booms; so revenue is spent rather than saved.    Chile avoids 
such wishful thinking by having independent panels of experts decide what 
is structural and what is cyclical. 
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Summary 
 
American fiscal policy over the last decade has usually been procyclical, that is, 
destabilizing.   The U.S. government wasted the opportunity of the expansion period 
2001-2007 by running large budget deficits.   As a result, Washington as of 2010 felt 
constrained by inherited debts to withdraw fiscal stimulus, at a time when unemployment 
was still high.  Meanwhile, some emerging market and developing countries had learned 
how to run  countercyclical fiscal policy – saving in the boom and easing in the recession 
– during the same decade that rich countries forgot how to do it.      
 
The frenetic debate as to whether current fiscal policy should more expansionary 
or less is of less consequence than what is the longer term regime.   Consider the two 
different examples offered by the last two decades.   When the United States was able to 
take advantage of the 1992-2000 boom to eliminate its budget deficit and then to run 
surpluses in the last three years of the decade, the key legislation had been enacted in 
1991 and 1993.   Similarly, the renewed deficits of 2002-2010 were created by legislation 
passed in 2001 and 2003.   Americans need to take a perspective longer than the annual 
budget cycle or the bi-annual electoral cycle.   Bringing back intelligent fiscal policy 
means taking steps today to lock in long-term progress toward fiscal responsibility (such 
as enacting social security reform) while yet avoiding steps that would withdraw short-
term fiscal stimulus at a time when the economy is weak. 
 
It would help to have institutions that might insulate fiscal policy from some of 
the vagaries of politics.    Chile has achieved countercyclical fiscal policy over the last 
ten years by means of some institutions that could usefully be adopted by other countries.   
Chile has a rule that targets a structural budget deficit of zero.  But rules are not enough 
in themselves, as the failures of Europe’s Stability and Growth Pact illustrate.  In both 
Europe and U.S., budget forecasts that are systematically overly optimistic are an 
important part of the problem.  The key innovation that they might adopt from Chile is to 
vest responsibility for determining whether a given year’s deficit is structural or 
temporary in a panel of independent experts.   The alternative is that politicians, inclined 
to wishful thinking, forecast that booms will continue indefinitely, with the result that 
revenue is spent rather than saved.    
 
  2 
Two decades ago, many people had drawn a lesson from the 1980’s:  Japan’s 
variant of capitalism was the best model.  Other countries around the world should and 
would follow it.   Japan’s admired institutions included relationship banking, keiretsu, 
bonus compensation for workers, lifetime employment, consensus building, strategic 
trade policy, administrative guidance, pro-saving policies, and maximization of 
companies’ industrial capacity or market share.  These features were viewed as elements 
of Japanese economic success that were potentially worthy of emulation.    The Japanese 
model quickly lost its luster in the 1990’s, however, when the stock market and real 
estate market crashed, followed by many years of severe stagnation in the real economy.
1 
A decade ago, many thought that the lesson of the 1990’s had been that the United 
States’ variant of capitalism was the best model, and that other countries should and 
would follow.  The touted institutions included arms-length banking, competition for 
corporate control, Anglo-American securities markets, reliance on accounting firms and 
rating agencies, derivatives, bonus-compensation for executives, an adversarial legal 
system, deregulation, pro-consumer credit policies, and maximization of companies’ 
profits or share price. These features were viewed as elements of US economic success 
and potentially worthy of emulation. The American model quickly lost its attractiveness 
in the 2000’s, however, when the stock market and real estate market crashed.  Poor 
                                                            
1 The so-called revisionists, led by Johnson (1982), ridiculed economists’ beliefs in free 
trade and in the proposition that there could be such a thing as too much investment.   
The literature began with Vogel (1979), a book that was ahead of its time, and ended with  
Fingleton (1995), which was behind its time.  Frankel (1993) surveyed economists’ 
research on the Japanese financial system as of the end of the 1980s.    
  3economic performance left per capita income and median household income below their 
levels of 2000 -- even before the severe US-originated recession of 2008-09.
2   
 
Where should countries look now, for models of economic success to emulate? 
Perhaps they should look to the periphery of the world economy.  Some smaller 
and less-rich countries have experimented with policies and institutions that could 
usefully be adopted by others. Singapore achieved rich country status with a unique 
development strategy.  Among its innovations was a paternalistic approach to saving.  
Costa Rica in Central America and Mauritius in Africa are each conspicuous performance 
standouts in their respective regions.  Among many other decisions that worked out well, 
both countries have foregone a standing army.  The result in both cases has been histories 
with no coups and with financial savings that could be used for education and other good 
things.   Slovakia and Estonia in Central/Eastern Europe (and Mauritius again) have 
simplified their tax systems by means of a flat tax.
3    
Some of the lessons from emerging market countries can be useful for the big 
advanced countries.   Two illustrations from microeconomics.   First, Singapore 
pioneered the use of the price mechanism to reduce traffic congestion in its urban center.   
London emulated Singapore when it successfully adopted congestion pricing in 2003;  
other big cities should do the same.   Second Mexico pioneered Conditional Cash 
Transfers. CCT programs, which make poverty benefits contingent on children’s school 
                                                            
2 Frankel (2001) gave the author’s views on the US capitalist model and claims of a “New 
Economy” as of the end of the 1990s. 
3 Examples of influential innovations from small advanced periphery countries: Inflation 
Targeting in New Zealand and FDI-friendly tax policy in Ireland.  I have pondered the 
success of Mauritius in Frankel (2010a). 
  4attendance, have been emulated in many countries, and embraced even in New York 
City.
4 
 
Some emerging market and developing countries also have lessons for the United 
States in areas of macroeconomics, specifically regarding the cyclicality of fiscal policy.      
To state the message of this paper most succinctly, over the last decade countries from 
Chile to China learned how to run properly counter-cyclical fiscal policy:  taking 
advantage of boom periods such as 2003-08 to achieve high national savings, and in 
particular to run budget surpluses, which then allows some fiscal ease in response to 
downturns such as 2008-09.    During this same period, advanced countries such as the 
United States and United Kingdom forgot how to run counter-cyclical fiscal policy.   
Perhaps the “leaders” could look to the “followers” for some tips on how to get back on 
track. 
 
 
1. What does it mean to draw lessons from the periphery? 
 
Before turning to specifics, let us elaborate on the larger theme that advanced 
economies could learn some things from developing countries.   This line of argument is 
not meant as an attack on Western values or modes of thought.   It is not a paean to 
Confucian values or native folk remedies in the Andes or Africa.   In my view, when 
Americans lectured others on the virtues of electoral democracy, the rule of law, and 
                                                            
4   On Conditional Cash Transfer programs, see Rawlings and Rubio (2005) and Fernald,  
Gertler, and Neufeld (2008).   Outside of the economic area as well, the United States 
could perhaps usefully emulate some institutions from southern neighbors.   Mexico has 
constitutional provisions for the resolution of disputed results in presidential elections 
without relying on rulings made by appointees of the party leaders themselves; Henríquez 
(2006). 
  5market-based economics, they were right.   Where they were wrong was the arrogance of 
the lectures, most especially the failure to see that their own country needed to be on the 
receiving end just as much as developing countries.
5 
In some cases, American or Western institutions were successfully transplanted to 
other countries in the past, and now needed to be re-imported.    An analogy.   In the 
latter part of the 19
th century the vineyards of France and other parts of Europe were 
destroyed by the microscopic aphid Phylloxera vastatrix.  Eventually a desperate last 
resort was tried: grafting susceptible European vines onto resistant American root 
stock, which of course had originally been imported from Europe.  Purist French 
vintners initially disdained what they considered compromising the refined tastes of 
their grape varieties.   But it saved the European vineyards, and did not impair the 
quality of the wine.   The New World had come to the rescue of the Old. 
Countries that are small, or far-away, or newly independent, or that are just 
emerging from a devastating war, are often more free to experiment, than is the United 
States or other large established countries.  Not all the experiments will succeed.  But 
some will.  The results may include some useful lessons for others, including for the big 
guys.
  
This paper examines the problem of how to make fiscal policy countercyclical.   
Fiscal policy in the United States, United Kingdom and other advanced countries became 
less countercyclical after 2001, as governments wasted the opportunity of the 2002-07 
expansion period by running large budget deficits.     Meanwhile fiscal policy in Chile 
                                                            
5  The proposition that fears regarding managerial incentives and crony capitalism were 
relevant not just to the financial sector in developing countries but to the United States as 
well was put forward before the global financial crisis by Rajan (2005) and after the crisis 
by Johnson (2009).   
  6became more countercyclical – saving in the boom and easing in the 2008-09 recession – 
during the same decade that rich countries forgot how to do it.     It has achieved 
countercyclical fiscal policy by means of some institutions that could usefully be adopted 
by other countries.    
Chile has a rule that targets a structural budget deficit of zero.  But rules are not 
enough in themselves, as the failures of Europe’s Stability and Growth Pact illustrate.  In 
both Europe and U.S., budget forecasts that are systematically overly optimistic are an 
important part of the problem.  Chile’s key innovation was to vest responsibility for 
estimating the long-run trends in budget determinants in panels of independent experts.   
Other countries might usefully follow Chile’s lead, and develop independent institutions 
that would determine whether a given year’s deficit is structural or temporary.   The 
alternative is that politicians, inclined to wishful thinking, forecast that booms will 
continue indefinitely, with the result that revenue is spent rather than saved.    
The paper begins with a discussion of fiscal policy in the United States and other 
advanced countries.  It then turns to the poor performance of institutional structures that 
are supposed to keep fiscal policy under control.  The core is the lesson from the 
periphery – Chile’s institutional structure. 
 
 
2. The U.S. debate over fiscal policy 
 
The issue at the top of the policy agenda in the United States and United Kingdom 
now is fiscal policy.   Whether American fiscal policy gets back on track will certainly be 
an important determinant of the country’s economic performance in years to come. 
  7The public discussion is typically framed as if it is a battle between conservatives 
who philosophically believe in strong budgets and small government, and liberals who do 
not.    In my view this is not the right way to characterize the debate.  Let us waive the 
commonly made point that small government is classically supposed to be the aim of 
“liberals”, in the 19
th century definition, not “conservatives,” and vice versa.   My point is 
very different:  those who call themselves conservatives in practice tend to adopt policies 
that are the opposite of fiscal conservatism.
6     
In the first place, the right goal should be budgets that allow surpluses in booms 
and deficits in recession.    In the second place, the correlation between how loudly an 
American politician proclaims a belief in fiscal conservatism and how likely he or she is 
to take corresponding policy steps is not positive.    
I can offer three pieces of evidence to bolster the proposition that politicians who 
describe themselves as fiscal conservatives in rhetoric do the opposite in practice: 
(i) The pattern of states whose Senators win pork barrel projects and other federal 
spending in their home states:   “Red states” tend on average to take home significantly 
more federal dollars than “blue states.”  Figure 1 shows the correlation between the 
tendency to vote Republican, shown on the vertical axis, and the state’s ranking in the 
federal dollars sweepstakes shown on the horizontal axis, with the winning states to the 
right.
7 
                                                            
6  I would prefer to call their policies “illiberal” to clarify that their policies are neither 
liberal in the 19
th century sense nor conservative in the modern sense.  This claim applies 
not just to their fiscal policies, but also in other economic matters such as monetary 
policy and trade policy as well.  (Frankel, 2003.)   The same is true with respect to social 
policy and foreign policy: modern-day American conservatives in practice favor 
government intervention and radical departures from past practice. 
7  New Jersey is the state that takes the least money home, New Mexico the most. 
  8 
Figure 1: States ranked by federal spending received per tax dollar paid in 2005  
versus party vote ratio in recent presidental elections 
 
Data sources: The Tax Foundation and Atlas of US Presidential Elections. 
 
(ii) The pattern of spending under Republican presidents.     When Ronald Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, entered the White House, not only did budget 
deficits rise sharply, but the rate of growth of federal spending rose sharply each time as 
well, as Figure 2 shows.
8  
                                                            
8  The correlation between budget deficits and spending is positive (.86).   The data reject 
the Starve the Beast Hypothesis (tax-cut-induced budget deficits such as those of the 
1980s and 2000s put downward pressure on spending).  The data instead support the 
Shared Sacrifice hypothesis (budget deficits can be eliminated under a regime that 
constrains both on the tax and spending sides, as in the 1990s). 
  9(iii) The voting pattern among the 258 members of Congress who signed an 
unconditional pledge in 2004 not to raise taxes:  They voted for greater increases in 
spending than those who did not sign the pledge.
9 
Figure 2: The Shared Sacrifice approach (1990s) succeeded in eliminating budget 
deficits, but the Starve the Beast approach failed (1980s) and (2000s).   
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How are leaders who seek to convince others that they are fiscal conservatives – 
and probably themselves as well – able to enact tax and spending policies that produce 
large budget deficits?   They do so by means of overly optimistic predictions.  Often they 
make overly optimistic assumptions about the economic growth rate and other baseline 
macroeconomic variables.
10   They also often make overly optimistic assumptions about 
the boost to growth rates and tax revenues that their policies will yield.   Finally, they 
sometimes deliberately manipulate the timing of legislation so as to mis-represent their 
plans. 
                                                            
9   Gale and Kelly (2004).   
10  This stratagem in the Reagan White House was anthropomorphized under the name 
Ms. Rosy Scenario.   Stockman (1986) and Feldstein (1994, pp. 50, 53). 
  10For example, when the Bush administration took office in January 2001, it 
forecast that the budget surplus it inherited would not only continue but would rise in the 
future, and would cumulate to $5 trillion over the coming decade in round numbers.  As 
the actual budget numbers came in, it was forced to revise downward its near-term 
forecasts every six months, as Figure 3 shows.  Even after a recession began in March 
2001, the Administration continued to forecast surpluses.  Even after the actual balance 
turned negative in 2002, it predicted that the deficits would soon disappear and turn back 
into rising surpluses.   Throughout President Bush’s eight years in office, the official 
forecasts never stopped showing surpluses after 2011. 
 
Figure 3:    Official U.S. Forecasts for 2002, 2003, and 2004 Budget Surpluses, 
as Revised Every 6 Months 
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  11How were officials able to make forecasts that departed so far from subsequent 
reality?   In three sorts of ways.  The first comes in the form of baseline macroeconomic 
assumptions.  Making overly optimistic forecasts of GDP is of course an old trick.  A 
more subtle component of the over-optimistic forecasts of 2001 (small, but revealing):  
An incoming political appointee at the Office of Management and Budget decided to 
raise an obscure parameter estimate, the share of labor income in GDP, from the existing 
technocratic professional estimate.  Because labor income is taxed at higher rates than 
capital income, the change had the effect of artificially raising the forecast for future tax 
revenue. 
More importantly, Bush Administration officials argued publically that their tax 
cuts were consistent with fiscal discipline by appealing to two fanciful theories:   the 
Laffer Proposition, which says that cuts in tax rates will pay for themselves via higher 
economic activity, and the Starve the Beast Hypothesis, which says that tax cuts will 
increase the budget deficit and put downward pressure on federal spending.     It is 
insufficiently remarked that the two propositions are inconsistent with each other:   
reductions in tax rates can’t increase tax revenues and reduce tax revenues at the same 
time.    But being mutually exclusive does not prevent them both from being wrong.     
The Laffer Proposition, while theoretically possible under certain conditions, does not 
apply to the US income tax rate:  a cut in those rates reduces revenue, precisely as 
common sense would indicate.    This was the outcome of the Bush tax cuts of 2001-03, 
as well as a similar big experiment earlier: the Reagan tax cuts of 1981-83.  Both 
episodes contributed to record US budget deficits.   Rejection of the Laffer Proposition is 
also the conclusion of more systematic scholarly studies, which rely on more than two 
  12data points and try to control for other factors that may be changing at the same time.  
Getting more major data points requires going further back in history, or including the 
experience of other countries, or both.
11  Finally, a heavy majority of professional 
economists reject the Proposition, including such illustrious economic advisers to 
Presidents Reagan and Bush II as Martin Feldstein, Glenn Hubbard and Greg Mankiw.   
So thorough is the discrediting of the Laffer Hypothesis, that some deny that these two 
presidents or their top officials could have ever believed such a thing.   But abundant 
quotes suggest that they did.
12 
The Starve the Beast Hypothesis claims that politicians cannot spend money that 
they don’t have.  In theory, Congressmen are supposedly inhibited from increasing 
spending by constituents’ fears that the resulting deficits will mean higher taxes for their 
grandchildren.     The theory fails on both conceptual grounds and empirical grounds.   
Conceptually, one should begin by asking: what it the alternative fiscal regime to which 
Starve the Beast is being compared?     The natural alternative is the regime that was in 
place during the 1990s, which I call Shared Sacrifice.    During that time, any 
congressman wishing to increase spending had to show how he or she would raise taxes 
to pay for it.   Logically, a Congressman contemplating a new spending program to 
benefit some favored supporters will be more inhibited by fears of other constituents 
complaining about an immediate tax increase (under the regime of Shared Sacrifice) than 
by fears of constituents complaining that budget deficits might mean higher taxes many 
                                                            
11 Goolsbee (1999) analyzes six different U.S. tax changes since 1922.  Trabandt and 
Uhlig (2010) use international evidence to examine the shape of the Laffer curve.   
Heijman and van Ophem (2005) try also to account for rising tax rates driving economic 
activities "underground." 
12 Further evidence and references on the Laffer Proposition are given in Frankel (2008). 
  13years into the future (under Starve the Beast).   Sure enough, the Shared Sacrifice 
approach of the 1990s succeeded in eliminating budget deficits, and did so to a 
substantial degree by cutting the growth of spending.  Compare this outcome to the sharp 
increases in spending that took place when President Reagan took office, when the first 
President Bush took office, and when the second President Bush took office (Figure 2).
13 
As with the Laffer Hypothesis, more systematic econometric analysis confirms 
the rejection of the Starve the Beast Hypothesis.   This is the finding of unbiased 
researchers, whether they are true libertarians (traditional fiscal conservatives) who 
would prefer to shrink government spending, such as William Niskanen (President of the 
Cato Institute and formerly Member of Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers), 
or others who might be characterized as of a more liberal bent politically.
14     
Overoptimistic macroeconomic assumptions worked in the context of OMB 
forecasts, and the Laffer and Starve the Beast Hypotheses each gained some traction in 
the court of public opinion. But to get optimistic fiscal forecasts out of the Congressional 
Budget Office some more extreme tricks were required, as the independent agency 
declined to succumb to the Laffer Proposition, even when headed by a Republican and 
                                                            
13 Evidence and references on the Starve the Beast Hypothesis are given in Frankel 
(2008).  The periods of the Starve the Beast regime versus the Shared Sacrifice regime do 
not correspond perfectly to the periods of Republican versus Democratic presidents, 
respectively. They correspond better to decades.  The first two years of George H.W. 
Bush’s presidency, 1989-90, were a continuation of Reagan’s policies fiscally (the 
infamous “no new taxes” pledge).  But the first President Bush deserves credit for 
reversing course in 1990 and negotiating with congressional Democrats the beginning of 
the Shared Sacrifice regime (including spending caps and the Pay As You Go rules, 
which were not allowed to lapse until 2001).    Conversely, the first two years of Barack 
Obama’s presidency, 2009-2010, were arguably a continuation of the second Bush’s 
fiscal policies (for example, congressional Republicans insisted that all the Bush tax cuts 
be extended past their 2010 sunset dates). 
14  Niskanen (2002, 2004, 2006), Gale and Orszag (2005), and Romer and Romer (2007).     
  14even when responding to congressional demands that it consider “dynamic scoring” of 
tax cuts.
15    
To understand the tricks, begin with the requirement that CBO’s baseline 
forecasts must take their tax and spending assumptions from current law.   The Bush 
Administration exploited this by excising from current law expensive policies that they 
had every intention of pursuing in the future, often explicitly so.   Four examples: the 
continuation of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (which were always paid for with 
“supplemental” budget requests when the time came, as if they were an unpredictable 
surprise); annual revocation of purported cuts in payments to doctors that would have 
driven them out of Medicare if ever allowed to go into effect; annual patches for the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (which otherwise threatened to expose millions of middle 
class families to taxes that had never been intended to apply to them); and the intended 
extension in 2011 of the income tax cuts and estate tax abolition that were legislated in 
2001 with a phony sunset provision for 2010.    All four are examples of expensive policy 
measures that the Administration fully intended would take place, but that they excluded 
from legislation so that the official forecasts would misleadingly appear to show smaller 
deficits and a return to surplus after 2010. 
Unrealistic macroeconomic assumptions, fanciful behavioral theories, and 
legislation that deliberately misrepresents policy plans were all crude ways to get overly 
optimistic forecasts.   But they were not too crude to fool much of the public.  Politicians 
                                                            
15  Under Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the CBO in 2003 estimated dynamic scoring, but 
did not find that tax cuts came anywhere near paying for themselves.  For details see   
Frankel (2008, 12-14). 
  15were able to continue posing as fiscal conservatives while enacting tax and spending 
policies that implied ever-widening budget deficits. 
Let us summarize the conclusion of the section. The fiscal mess that the United 
States finds itself in is to some extent attributable to a pattern in recent decades of overly 
optimistic budget forecasts by government officials.  To justify running large budget 
deficits, even in periods of strong income, they have often unrealistically forecast that the 
budget deficits will go away in the future.  But how is it done in other parts of the world? 
 
 
3. An historic shift in fiscal policies among some countries in the South 
 
In the past, a heavy majority of developing countries showed a pattern of 
fiscal policy that was procyclical or – to use a blunter word – destabilizing.
16    This 
was especially true of countries that exported oil, minerals, and agricultural 
commodities, and particularly countries in Latin America.
17  When world 
commodity markets boomed and governments should have saved the higher tax 
revenue, they would instead spend more, sometimes because they mistakenly 
thought that the boom would last indefinitely.   When commodity prices turned back 
down, the country would be forced to cut spending, thereby exacerbating the 
downturn.     
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) studied procyclicality for 104 countries 
over the period 1960-2003.  Figure 4, taken from their study, shows for each 
country the correlation between real government spending and output, both of them 
                                                            
16 Procyclical fiscal policy among developing countries has been studied by Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Végh (2005), Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), 
Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), Ilzetski and Vegh (2008) and Medas and Zakharova (2009). 
17 Gavin and Perotti (1997), Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) and Perry (2003).     
  16cyclically adjusted.    Almost every developing country, represented by the light 
bars, shows a positive correlation, approaching +1 in the case of Oman.  This 
indicates procyclical fiscal policy.  Almost every advanced country, represented by 
the black bars, shows a negative correlation, approaching -1 in the case of Finland.  
This indicates countercyclical fiscal policy.   During this period, 1960-2003, the US 
and UK show up with negative correlation coefficients that place them among the 
half-dozen most countercyclical countries. 
 
   Figure 4:  Cyclical correlations between government spending and GDP through 2003 
 
 
Source: Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2005). 
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries.  
The cyclical components of both variables were estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. 
Real government expenditure is defined as Central Government expenditure deflated by the GDP deflator. 
A positive correlation indicates procyclical fiscal policy.                Data Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF. 
 
 
Over the last decade – and perhaps in reaction to the emerging market crises 
of the late 1990s – some emerging market countries have moved in the direction of 
countercyclical or stabilizing fiscal policies.   They took advantage of the boom 
years 2003-2007 to run primary budget surpluses.   They reduced their debts, in 
  17many cases, to levels lower than the United States and other OECD countries.  By 
2007, on the eve of the global financial crisis, Latin America and the Caribbean had 
reduced its debt to 33% of GDP, as compared to 63 % in the United States.    Debt 
levels among the top 20 rich countries (debt/GDP ratios around 80%) are now twice those 
of the top 20 emerging markets.   Some emerging markets – pronounced “debt intolerant” 
not long ago -- have earned credit ratings higher than some so-called advanced countries.   
Korea now has a better credit rating that Portugal.   Not only Chile, but also Malaysia, 
Mexico, Poland and South Africa, now have higher credit ratings than Greece or Iceland.   
China by 2011 had achieved a credit rating as strong as Japan’s.. 
A stronger fiscal position is one of the reasons that countries such as China could 
afford to undertake large and sustained fiscal stimulus in response to the 2008-09 global 
recession.   Other big emerging markets such as Brazil and Indonesia also found 
themselves freed of the need to cut spending in a recession, and were better able to sail 
through than the industrialized countries.   The United States and United Kingdom, by 
contrast, had wasted the preceding expansion running budget deficits, and hence by 2010 
had come to feel heavily constrained by their debts.  As of the date of writing, fiscal 
consolidation is the political priority in both countries, notwithstanding that output is still 
well below most measures of potential output. 
 
 
4. What sort of institutions can insulate governments against political pressures to 
overspend in booms? 
 
The advice to save in a boom is standard.   One would like to be able to do more 
than cite historical examples of governments that have had the courage to take away the 
fiscal punch bowl.    One would like an example of an innovation designed to deliver 
  18countercyclical fiscal policy, an institution that might serve as a template for other 
countries, a model that can help even in times and places where the political forces to 
follow procyclical fiscal policy would otherwise be too strong to resist.  
  The institutions that first come to mind are budget rules, such as the Stability and 
Growth Pact that supposedly constrains fiscal policy among euro members or the 
Balanced Budget Amendment which has periodically been debated in the United States.    
But the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and other such rules have failed miserably, as 
the sovereign debt troubles in Greece and others on the European periphery had made 
clear for all to see by 2010.    At no point have the SGP’s limits on budget deficits and 
debt levels been credible. 
The problems with a simple deficit ceiling rule such as the SGP are well known.   
If governments are not allowed to run larger budget deficits in recessions than in other 
times, the recessions will be exacerbated.    Indeed, the damage in that circumstance is 
sufficiently great that it is not politically credible that the country will stick with the rule 
in the first place.
18 
The alternative is a structural budget rule, one that requires the government to 
balance the budget on a cyclically adjusted basis.    The rule dictates that in a boom 
spending can be increased, or taxes cut, only to the extent that the growth and therefore 
surging revenues are deemed permanent.  To the extent that the boom is temporary, the 
revenue should be saved via budget surpluses.  This requires forecasts of the short-term 
and long-term paths of key economic variables.    When the economy is expanding, the 
computation of the structural budget requires an estimate of the extent to which the boom 
                                                            
18  For this reason, stricter rules in some cases are less credible. Neut and Velasco (2003). 
  19is permanent or temporary.    When the economy is in recession, the computation requires 
an estimate of whether it will recover quickly. 
A problem with most budget rules is that such estimation is made by government 
agencies that are subject to the usual pressures of the political process.    Given the 
genuine uncertainty that surrounds any such estimates, the political pressures need not 
necessarily be intense for the result to be overly optimistic forecasts of economic growth 
and revenues.   Those forecasts in turn are an excuse for over-spending in the boom.     
Research has found econometric support for a series of eight hypotheses regarding 
forecasts by official agencies that have responsibility for formulating the budget.  The 
statistical evidence suggests that the overly optimistic U.S. budget forecasts of 2001-08 
were not an isolated historical episode, but were rather part of a larger historical pattern.  
Taken together, these seven hypotheses suggest that countries could make their fiscal 
policies more countercyclical if they adopted institutional arrangements to protect budget 
forecasting from political pressures, arrangements such as those adopted by Chile over 
the past decade.
19    
 
1)  Official forecasts of budgets and GDP are overly optimistic on average.  For the 
United States, McNees (1995) and Auerbach (1994) found an optimistic bias in official forecasts 
of growth. Auerbach (1999) found a tendency for OMB to overestimate revenues during the 
period 1986-93, but found a tendency to underestimate revenues during the period 1993-99 
(during the Clinton Administration).  Frendreis and Tatalovich (2000) and McNab, Rider, and 
Wall (2007) also find bias in OMB forecasts, which they attribute to political influences.  Forni 
                                                            
19  Frankel (2011) gives further details on the empirical results reported here, the Chilean 
system, and the literature. 
  20and Momigliano (2004) find optimism bias among OECD countries more generally.  Ashiya 
(2005) finds that official Japanese growth forecasts at a 16-month horizon are biased upwards.  
Jonung and Larch (2006) find a clear tendency for EU governments, when making budget plans, 
to overestimate the economic growth rate.   Most of these authors argue that the systematic over-
optimism in ex ante forecasts translates directly into larger ex post deficits.   
 
2)  The bias toward over-optimism is greater in booms, and increases with the 
horizon of the forecasts.   Apparently government policy-makers are subject to wishful 
thinking, so that each boom is judged to be permanent.
20    Tables 1a and 1b reports the 
results of regressions to explain official errors in forecasting the GDP growth rate, for a 
sample of 33 countries.
21   Tables 2a and 2b report analogous results to explain official 
errors in forecasting the budget surplus.  The constant term is always highly significant, 
confirming that forecasts are overly optimistic on average. 
                                                            
20  This pattern is captured by the slogan “this time is different” highlighted by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009). 
21  The data are drawn from 1985-2009, although some of the 33 countries are missing 
data for the early years.   Most countries do not make available a time series of official 
budget forecasts.  For details see Frankel (2011), particularly the Data Appendix.  
Estimation results with fixed effects are available in a subsequent paper. 
  21Table 1a:    GDP Growth Error in Official Forecast ‐‐ effect of GDP gap, in 33 countries  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  One year ahead  Two years ahead  Three years ahead 
       
GDP 
1/  0.204***  0.497***  0.660*** 
  (0.033)  (0.078)  (0.153) 
      
Constant  0.265***  0.799***  1.438*** 
  (0.091)  (0.130)  (0.210) 
       
Observations  368  282  175 
R
2  0.138  0.298  0.303 
RMSE  2.234  2.945  3.397 
 
Table 1b: GDP Growth Error in Official Forecast ‐‐ effect of absolute GDP gap 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  One year ahead  Two years ahead  Three years ahead 
Absolute GDP
2/  0.133  0.531***  0.743*** 
  (0.106)  (0.114)  (0.233) 
Constant ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.255  0.133 
  (0.242)  (0.314)  (0.491) 
Observations  368  282  175 
R
2  0.035  0.201  0.220 
RMSE  2.363  3.142  3.594 
1/ GDP is measured as deviation from a quadratic trend, and lagged so that it lines up with the year in which the forecast was made. 
2/ Absolute GDP is the absolute value of the GDP deviation. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                    Robust standard errors in parentheses,  c lustered by country.   
 
Table 2a:   Budget Balance Error in Official Forecast as % of GDP – effect of GDP gap, in 33 countries  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  One year ahead Two years ahead  Three years ahead 
       
GDP 
1/  0.093***  0.258***  0.289*** 
  (0.019)  (0.040)  (0.063) 
Constant  0.201  0.649***  1.364*** 
  (0.197)  (0.231)  (0.348) 
       
Observations  398  300  179 
R
2  0.033  0.113  0.092 
RMSE  2.248  2.732  3.095 
 
Table 2b: Budget Balance Error in Official Forecast as % of GDP – effect of absolute GDP gap 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  One year ahead  Two years ahead  Three years ahead 
       
Absolute GDP
2/  0.056  0.245***  0.325*** 
  (0.069)  (0.064)  (0.113) 
Constant  0.069  0.180  0.780** 
  (0.157)  (0.237)  (0.319) 
       
Observations  398  300  179 
R
2  0.007  0.060  0.066 
RMSE  2.277  2.814  3.139 
1/ GDP is measured as deviation from a quadratic trend, and lagged so that it lines up with the year in which the forecast was made. 
2/ Absolute GDP is the absolute value of the GDP deviation. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   Robust standard errors in parentheses, c lustered by country.   
  223)  The bias may be present at both ends of the business cycle.  In Tables 1a and 2a 
the coefficient on GDP at the time of the forecast (relative to a long-term quadratic trend) 
is always highly significant, showing that over-optimism is greater at the height of the 
business cycle.  The unconditional and conditional biases both increase substantially as 
one moves from the one-year horizon to the three-year horizon.  In Tables 1b and 2b the 
coefficient on the absolute value of the GDP gap is also highly significant at the two and 
three-year horizons, indicating that the bias may be associated with periods of unusually 
low GDP as well as unusually high GDP.  A plausible interpretation is that genuine 
uncertainty is high both at the top of the business cycle and at the bottom, so that there is 
more scope for wishful thinking. 
4)  The bias is greater among those European governments that are politically 
subject to the budget rules in the Stability and Growth Pact because they have joined the 
euro.   Authors have found a statistically significant optimism bias for some particular 
euro members:  France, Italy and Portugal over the period 1991-2002 (Strauch, et al., 
2004), and Germany, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal when the data set is 
updated to 2004 (Von Hagen, et al, 2009).   Brück and Stephan (2006) explicitly conclude 
that Eurozone governments have manipulated deficit forecasts before elections since the 
introduction of the SGP.  Similarly, Beetsma et al (2009) find that ex post budget 
balances among SGP countries systematically fall short of official ex ante plans.   
Marinheiro (2010) adds another complete business cycle to the data under the SGP, and 
again finds that the forecasts of European fiscal authorities are overly optimistic on 
average.  This evidence is not consistently strong across the set of 15 EU countries, but 
  23the bias is again high for the euro countries France, Italy and Portugal at all forecast 
horizons.    
We return to our data set of 33 countries and add a dummy for members of the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  Table 3 seeks to explain errors in official forecasts of the 
growth rate and Table 4 seeks to explain errors in official forecasts of the budget deficit.   
We see that countries that are nominally under the budget rules of the SGP are prone to 
more upward bias in their forecasts than other countries, that the bias is concentrated in 
boom years, and that the bias is again worse at the longer-term horizons than at the one-
year horizon. 
 
Table 3:   Budget balance error in official forecast as  % of GDP ‐‐ effect of SGP rules, in 33 countries  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  One year ahead  Two years 
ahead 
Three years 
ahead 
One year ahead Two years 
ahead 
Three years 
ahead 
             
SGP dummy 
1/  0.658  0.905**  0.593  0.407  0.276  0.0219 
 
  (0.398)  (0.406)  (0.477)  (0.355)  (0.438)  (0.515) 
SGP*GDP 
2/        0.189**  0.497***  0.551*** 
        (0.083)  (0.107)  (0.132) 
Constant  0.0330  0.466*  1.214***  0.033  0.466*  1.214*** 
  (0.228)  (0.248)  (0.435)  (0.229)  (0.249)  (0.436) 
             
Observations  399  300  179  398  300  179 
R
2  0.018  0.022  0.008  0.030  0.080  0.076 
RMSE  2.264  2.869  3.235  2.254  2.788  3.132 
 
Table 4: GDP Growth Rate Error in Official Forecast – effect of SGP rules, in 33 countries  
VARIABLES  One year  
ahead 
Two years 
ahead 
Three years 
ahead 
One year 
ahead 
Two years 
ahead 
Three years 
ahead 
             
SGP dummy 
1/  0.379*  0.563* ‐ 0.694  0.179 ‐ 0.028 ‐ 1.189* 
  (0.199)  (0.304)  (0.643)  (0.222)  (0.374)  (0.674) 
SGP*GDP 
2/        0.136*  0.467***  0.477*** 
 
      (0.067)  (0.125)  (0.133) 
Constant  0.239  0.876***  2.207***  0.239  0.876***  2.207*** 
  (0.168)  (0.251)  (0.623)  (0.168)  (0.251)  (0.625) 
 
Observations 
 
369 
 
282 
 
175 
 
368 
 
282 
 
175 
R‐squared  0.006  0.006  0.007  0.011  0.043  0.040 
RMSE  2.404  3.503  4.054  2.395  3.444  3.998 
1/  SGP is a dummy for countries that are members of the euro and thus subject to the budget rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
2/ GDP is measured as deviation from a quadratic trend and lagged so as to line up with the year in which the forecast was made. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1              Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Thus official forecasts, if not insulated from politics, tend to be overly optimistic in 
booms, and the problem can be worse when the government is formally subject to a 
budget rule.   Chile’s structural budget institutions offer a possible solution to this 
problem.   Since 2000, fiscal policy in Chile has been governed by a structural budget 
rule that has succeeded in implementing countercyclical fiscal policy.  This 
accomplishment is all the more noteworthy in that Latin American countries dependent 
on commodity exports have historically experienced fiscal policies that were highly 
procyclical.   During the 2003-08 boom, the result was a substantial increase in national 
savings, some of it dedicated to funding of pension-related liabilities of the government.  
The key innovation is that the responsibility for estimating the extent to which 
contemporaneous copper prices and GDP have departed from their long-run averages is 
given to panels of independent experts and thus insulated from the political process.    
  
Further findings: 
5)  In most countries, the real growth rate is the key macroeconomic input for budget 
forecasting.  Table 5 shows, for a sample of 33 countries, the highly significant 
relationship between growth and the budget surplus.  For every 1 per cent of growth, 
relative to what was forecast previously, the budget improves by about half that amount, 
relative to what was forecast previously. 
  25Table 5: GDP growth as a short‐term determinant of budget balance in 33 countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  One year ahead  Two years ahead  Three years ahead 
       
GDP error  0.490***  0.512***  0.455*** 
 
  (0.053)  (0.069)  (0.079) 
Constant  0.102  0.271  0.724** 
  (0.172)  (0.247)  (0.346) 
      
Observations  367  277  175 
R
2  0.280  0.369  0.322 
RMSE  1.897  2.365  2.690 
 
Dependent variable is budget surplus as a share of GDP, expressed relative to earlier forecast. 
Independent variable is GDP expressed relative to earlier forecast at same horizon.   Details in Frankel (2011). 
 
 
6)  In Chile the price of copper is the most important single macroeconomic input for 
forecasting the budget.    Table 6 reports for Chile the regression of short-term 
determination of the budget, analogous to the preceding table, but with the addition of the 
copper price.  (Again both variables are expressed relative to the attempt to forecast them 
earlier.)   The copper price dominates GDP in budget forecasting.   Figure 5 illustrates the 
relationship graphically. 
 
 
Table 6: Short‐term determinants of Chile’s budget deficit 
Regression of budget balance (ex post budget relative to forecast) 
against macroeconomic variables (ex post relative to forecast). 
1990‐2009 (20 observations) 
VARIABLES  Coefficient estimates 
     
Copper price movement 1/  0.060**  0.056** 
  (0.021)  (0.021) 
GDP movement  0.239  
  (0.187)  
Constant  0.023  0.163 
  (0.754)  (0.683) 
     
R 
2  0.299  0.251 
RMSE  2.655  2.666 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
1.  The copper price movement is here measured as  [log(average of end of month price, Jan.– Dec., of 
the next year) – log(August 15‐month forward price)]*100 
 
 
  26Figure 5:  Short‐term influence of copper price movements on Chile’s budget 
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7)  Real copper prices on average revert gradually back to a long run trend.  This is 
not always readily perceived, however.  For one thing, 30 years of experience is 
not enough to discern the pattern; one needs a century or two of data.   For 
another thing, forecasts are more uncertain in booms, as judged by option-implied 
volatility.  Thus it is easy to see how government officials could mistakenly 
extrapolate commodity price upswings and, in light of the preceding finding, how 
this would in turn lead to overly optimistic budget forecasts.   
8)  Unlike in other countries, Chile’s official forecasts are not overly optimistic on 
average.   Figure 6 plots budget forecast errors across countries and across time.  
The horizontal axis is the output gap at the time of the forecast.   Other countries 
frequently overestimate their budget surplus, especially when output is high.  (A 
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  27Figure 6: Chile’s Official Budget Forecasts are Not Prone to the Optimism Bias of Other Countries 
Annual data, 1985‐2010, 33 countries.   
 
 
Data sources and other details in Frankel (2011). 
 
  28Chile’s fiscal institutions could usefully be emulated everywhere, most obviously in other 
commodity-exporting countries, but in industrialized countries as well.
22    
 
 
 
5.  Countercyclical fiscal institutions generalized for other countries 
 
  Any country could usefully apply variants of the Chilean fiscal device, not just 
producers of minerals.   Even large diversified industrialized countries could set up 
independent institutions charged by law with estimating the output gap and such other 
budget-relevant macroeconomic variables as the inflation rate and the fractions of GDP 
going to wage versus non-wage income.   In some countries, a useful reinforcement of 
the Chilean idea would be to formalize the details of the procedure into law and give the 
panels legal independence.  There could be laws protecting them from being fired, as 
there are for governors of independent central banks.  The principle of a separation of 
decision-making powers should be retained:  the rules as interpreted by the panels 
determine the total amount of spending or budget deficits, while the elected political 
leaders determine how that total is allocated. 
  There remain two technical questions: how much of the structural budget 
calculations are to be delegated to the independent panels of experts, and whether the 
budget rules are interpreted as ex ante or ex post.  The procedures that compute the 
structural balance in Chile involve a number of calculations that are in fact made inside 
the Ministry of Finance, rather than by the panels of experts.  One could imagine moving 
the locus of these calculations from the Ministry to the independent panels.  This might 
                                                            
22   Frankel (2011) explains and analyzes Chile’s structural budget institutions in more 
detail, and gives further references. 
  29require a standing bureaucracy, in the manner of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office.  
If the independent agency were given more comprehensive control over fiscal policy, it 
would then approach symmetry with the delegation of monetary policy to independent 
central banks.
23   But few reformers suggest that the details of tax and spending policy 
could or should be delegated to an agency that is not directly unaccountable in a 
democratic way. 
The second, related, question is whether the targeting is to be ex ante or ex post. 
An ex post rule for the budget deficits would have to be phrased as a target range, or as 
an upper bound, because unanticipated economic developments make it impossible for 
anyone to hit a budget target precisely.   The alternative is for the rule to be interpreted as 
ex ante:  tax rates, spending parameters and so forth are set so as to produce the desired 
target if all goes precisely as expected, while recognizing that there will be unanticipated 
deviations during the course of the year. 
  The analogous issue is familiar in the context of monetary policy.   If the target 
variable is the money supply or inflation rate, the authorities cannot be expected to hit it 
exactly, as opposed to the regime when the target is the price of gold or the exchange 
rate.  The usual approach is that the monetary authorities announce a target range for M1 
or the inflation rate.  Conceptually, a sincere central bank will set the range so that it can 
achieve an outcome within the specified range, say 95% of the time.    The public can 
then monitor the ability of the central bank to deliver on its commitment.   An alternative 
proposal is that the monetary authorities set the parameters so as to hit a desired ex ante 
                                                            
23  Wyplosz (2005) and Jonung and Larch (2006) have proposed setting up an 
independent Fiscal Policy Committee that would reproduce what independent Monetary 
Policy Committees do.  Others noting the analogy with monetary policy include Alesina 
and Perotti (1996).    
  30inflation target.  If the one true model of how the economy operates were known to the 
central bank, which in turn announced it to the public, the two procedures would be 
equivalent.  In reality however, the model is highly uncertain, everyone knows that it is 
uncertain, and different elements among the staff and different members of the monetary 
policy committee vary as to their preferred models.  Thus it is less practical to announce 
an ex ante target.  The members of the monetary policy committee would have to 
negotiate with each other an ever-changing common model and set of forecasts, a 
cumbersome way to go about negotiating a decision on monetary policy. 
  In the case of the fiscal expert panels, however, setting an ex ante target may be 
more feasible.   More precisely, the panel could be charged with evaluating whether the 
government’s budget proposal would hit the desired budget target, not only if output were 
at potential and the copper price were at its long run equilibrium, which they already have 
to do in Chile, but also, more comprehensively, if growth and other economic outcomes 
were at their expected levels. 
 
6. What should U.S. fiscal policy be? 
 
What changes in American fiscal policy would be desirable at the current 
juncture, if politics were not an obstacle?     On the one hand, as of late 2010, the 
economy is still weak.  On the other hand, if the U.S. waits until the recovery is complete, 
political support for tackling the deficit may vanish.  A two-part strategy is needed: 
1)  Steps to prolong the fiscal stimulus, designed to maximize bang for the buck. 
2)  Steps to lock in future progress back toward fiscal discipline in the long run. 
Maximizing bang for the buck means fiscal stimulus that gives the most increase 
in demand per dollar added to long-term debt.     Examples of measures that minimize 
  31bang for the buck are tax cuts aimed at the wealthy, such as those enacted originally in 
2001 and 2003 and extended in December 2010.  If the stimulus has to take the form of 
tax cuts, then the best options are some aimed at lower income workers.   Leaving issues 
of income distribution aside, tax cuts for low income workers are more effective both on 
the demand side (they have a higher marginal propensity to consume) and on the supply 
side (they face some of the greatest disincentives to work, when one adds the payroll tax 
to losses of benefits such as Medicaid and food stamps).  Some business tax cuts, such as 
temporary credits for investment or hiring, could also give high bang for the buck.    But, 
in general, spending boosts demand more than tax cuts do, because the latter are partly 
saved.   Appropriate areas for spending in the aftermath of the 2007 sub-prime crisis have 
been infrastructure investment, home insulation, and giving money to the states so that 
they don’t have to lay off teachers, policemen, firemen, transportation workers and 
construction workers. 
How does one take steps today to lock in future fiscal consolidation?    Not by 
raising taxes or cutting spending today (see above) nor by promising to do so in a year or 
two (not credible).     There are lots of economically sensible proposals for spending to 
eliminate, more efficient taxes to switch to, and “tax expenditures” to cut.   But most of 
these ideas face insuperable obstacles.   
One big reform might work best:   pass legislation today to put Social Security on 
a sound financial footing in the long term.    It would consist of a combination of raising 
the retirement age (just a little, in proportion to lengthening life spans), slowing the rate 
of growth of dollar benefits for future retirees (just a little, perhaps by “progressive 
indexation), and perhaps shifting some of the payroll tax burden to upper-income 
  32workers.    If Washington could fix Social Security, it would brighten up the long-term 
fiscal outlook.  And yet it would create little or no drag for the current fragile recovery. 
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